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Interstate Extradition: Should The Asylum State 
Governor Have Unbridled Discretion? 
The highest Good has like a halo shone 
About the Emperor's head, and he alone 
May validly accord it from above: 
The equity of Law!-What all men love, 
What all demand, desire, can't do without, 
His office must dispense it all about.' 
Kentucky u. Dennisona was a landmark decision of the 
United States Supreme Court concerning the extradition process 
provided for in the United States Constitution. In Dennison, 
Kentucky sought a writ of mandamus to compel the governor of 
Ohio to extradite an individual within Ohio's jurisdiction ac- 
cused of criminal activities in Kentucky.' The Supreme Court 
refused to issue the writ, but did not make clear whether its re- 
fusal was based upon a state sovereignty argument or the belief 
that the duty of the asylum state governor was not a ministerial, 
mandatory duty subject to mandamus.' Nevertheless, the prece- 
dential value of Dennison was apparently not impaired by its 
ambiguity; no state again sought to use mandamus to compel 
extradition for over 110 years,' even when refusals of legally suf- 
ficient extradition requests oc~urred.~ 
On December 28, 1976, the State of South Dakota filed a 
petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the extradition from 
California of a convicted felon.' The petition was first consid- 
1. J. GOETHE, FAUST 122 (W. Arndt trans. 1976). 
2. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861). 
3. Id. at 66. 
4. Id. at 106-10. 
5. See South Dakota v. Brown, 69 Cal. App. 3d 298, 138 Cal. Rptr. 14, 15 (1977), 
vacated, 20 Cal. 3d 765, 576 P.2d 473, 144 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1978) (the opinion has been 
deleted from 69 Cal. App. 3d and hereinafter Cal. App. 3d will not be cited). Brown was 
the first attempt since Dennison to use mandamus for extradition purposes. 
6. See Comment, Rendition: The Governor's Discretion, 2 LINCOLN L. REV. 48, 55- 
56 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Rendition]; Comment, Interstate Rendition: Executive 
Practices and the Effects of Discretion, 66 YALE L. J. 97,109-11 (1956) [hereinafter cited 
as Interstate Rendition]. 
7. The petition was originally fled on December 28, 1976, in the California Supreme 
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ered by the California Court of Appeal for the Third District, 
which held that the governor's duty to extradite was mandatory 
under state legislation. Since the governor was amenable to 
mandamus under California law, the Court accordingly issued 
the requested writ? However, the California Supreme Court va- 
cated this decision in South Dakota u. Brown.* The higher court 
held that although the duty of the governor can be characterized 
as mandatory, there is no provision for judicial compulsion of 
this duty under either federal lawlo or California's Uniform 
Criminal Extradition Act." 
South Dakota v. Brown and Kentucky u. Dennison are the 
only cases that directly confront the issue of judicial enforce- 
ment of the asylum state governor's duty to extradite. In 1861, 
Dennison held that the governor's duty under federal law was 
unenforceable by the federal courts.l"n 1978, Brown extended 
this holding to the state courts of California by finding the duty 
unenforceable under state or federal law? Both decisions were 
rendered in the presence of unusual pressures for and against 
extradition. This Comment will discuss the federal and uniform 
state extradition laws, examine the propriety of these two deci- 
sions, and suggest alternatives that might facilitate the resolu- 
tion of extradition disputes and temper the use of gubernatorial 
discretion. 
A. Federal Law 
The process of interstate extradition, also known as inter- 
state rendition," provides for the return of one who has broken 
Court and then transferred to the court of appeal. South Dakota v. Brown, 138 Cal. 
Rptr. at 15 n.1. 
8. The court declined to decide whether federal extradition provisions were enforce- 
able in state courts. The decision of the court of appeal was based upon what it found to 
be a mandatory duty imposed by CAL. PENAL CODE 8 1549.2 (West 1970). 138 Cal. Rptr. 
at  16. 
9. 20 Cal. 3d 765, 576 P.2d 473, 144 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1978). 
10. Id. at 771, 576 P.2d at 477,144 Cal. Rptr. at 762. The federal law referred to is 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, 3 2, cl. 2. 
11. 20 Cal. 3d at 773-74,576 P.2d at 478-79,144 Cal. Rptr. at 763-64. The statute is 
found at CAL. PENAL CODE 3s 1548-1556.2 (West 1970). 
12. 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 109-10. 
13. 20 Cal. 3d at 768, 576 P.2d at 475, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 760. 
14. The terms interstate rendition and extradition are both used to describe the 
process of returning a fugitive to the state from which he fled, as set forth in article IV of 
the Constitution. See Interstate Rendition, supra note 6, at 97 n.1. 
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the law in one state and subsequently taken refuge in another. 
That this process is immensely important to the effective admin- 
istration of our criminal justice system is an irrefutable 
proposition. 
Interstate extradition is authorized by article IV of the 
United States Constitution, which states, 
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or 
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in an- 
other State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the 
State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the 
State having Jurisdiction of the Crime? 
Apparently in response to objections that this clause did not 
specify the manner in which extradition was to be effected,'. 
Congress passed enabling legislation that reposed the duty of re- 
turning a fugitive in the "executive authority" of the asylum 
state: 
[Wlhenever the executive authority of any state in the Union, 
or of [a territory], shall demand any person as a fugitive from 
justice, of the executive authority of any such state or territory 
to which such person shall have fled, . . . it shall be the duty of 
the executive authority of the state or territory to which such 
person shall have fled, to cause him or her to be arrested and 
secured, and notice of the arrest to be given to the executive 
authority making such demands, or to the agent of such au- 
thority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugi- 
tive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear." 
Traditionally, the governor has carried out the duties of extradi- 
tion as the "executive authority" of the state; he is specifically 
given this duty in the uniform state extradition legislation.18 
B. Kentucky v. Dennison 
The first case to directly consider the asylum state gover- 
15. U.S. CONST. art. IV, 5 2, cl. 2. 
16. See Hoague, Extradition Between States, 13 AM. L. REV. 181, 192-98 (1879). 
17. Rendition Ad of 1793, ch. 7.5 1,l Stat. 302 (current version at  18 U.S.C. 5 3182 
(1976)). The portion of the Act not included in the text discusses the legal sufficiency of 
the demand. The demanding-state governor must produce an affidavit or indictment 
charging the demanded fugitive with a crime, and he must personally certify its authen- 
ticity. Id. 
18. See UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT 5 2. See generally Conley, Clearing the 
Fog (An Introduction to Extradition h w ) ,  4 ORANGE COUNTY B.J. 157 (1977); Yager, 
Extradition, 33 CAL. ST. B.J. 527 (1958). 
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nor's duty under federal legislation was Kentucky u. Dennison.lS 
In Dennison, the State of Kentucky attempted to compel the 
extradition from Ohio of Willis Lago, a "free man of color." 
Lago was sought by Kentucky for his criminal activities (under 
the laws of Kentucky) in helping a Negro slave escape from her 
master. Governor Dennison of Ohio refused to extradite the man 
because his actions were not illegal under the laws of Ohio. 
Therefore, Kentucky petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Governor Dennison to 
extradite Lago.'O 
Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the Supreme Court, 
stated that the "treason, felony, or other crime" language of arti- 
cle IV of the Constitution contemplated any offense that was 
punishable under the laws of the state where it was committed. 
Consequently, no equivalent law in the asylum state was re- 
quired for the offense to be extraditable." Moreover, the Court 
found that the duty of a governor under the Constitution and 
federal legislation "certainly is not a discretionary duty upon 
which he is to exercise any judgment, but is a mere ministerial 
Nevertheless, the Court held that "if the Governor of 
Ohio refuses to discharge this auty, there is no power delegated 
to the General Government, either through the Judicial Depart- 
ment or any other department, to use any coercive means to 
compel him."23 
As a result of Dennison, the idea of an extradition duty 
mandatory in nature but unenforceable in practice was estab- 
lished. Although the Court attempted to resolve this apparent 
contradition by identifying the duty as moral rather than a le- 
gal:4 the Court's rationale has been the subject of criticism. 
Those who take issue with the holding and rationale of Denni- 
son question whether the authors of the Constitution would 
have included a clause containing mandatory language if they 
had intended that it confer no enforceable duty.== 
19. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861). 
20. Id. at 66-67. 
21. Id. at 103. 
22. Id. at 106. 
23. Id. at 109-10. 
24. Id. at 107. 
25. E.g., Rendition, supra note 6,  at 58-59; Interstate Rendition, supra note 6,  at 
112. "Proponents of [the repudiation of Dennison] argue that Dennison was decided 
wrongly since the constitutional drafters would never have included a provision 
mandatory in language but unenforceable in practice." Id. 
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Given its historical context, the Dennison case brought un- 
usual pressures to bear upon the Court. The decision was ren- 
dered on the eve of the Civil War, when both slavery and states' 
rights were highly sensitive and emotionally charged issues. Fur- 
thermore, Chief Justice Taney, author of the Dennison opinion, 
was a Southerner and former slaveholder who retained a definite 
personal prejudice against blacks." As a Southerner, he was also 
a strong advocate of states' rights." Nevertheless, in spite of the 
strong emotional and political pressures surrounding the case, 
the Dennison rationale was generally approved of at  %he time.28 
It has since been rearmed by the Supreme Court" and sup- 
ported, in dicta, by several state court  decision^.^^ 
C. The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act 
It has long been acknowledged that a state has the preroga- 
tive to legislate to the extent that such legislation does not con- 
flict with the Constitution and federal legislation. Thus, states 
are free to extend extradition beyond the requirements of fed- 
eral law, but they cannot limit the federal extradition require- 
m e n t ~ . ~ ~  The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA), en- 
26. Taney's prejudice is evidenced by his writings: 
In [Taney's] private papers, he said that the African race, ". . . even when 
free, are everywhere a degraded class . . . " and were only citizens a t  the suf- 
ferance of the white majority. "They were never regarded as a constituent por- 
tion of the sovereignty of any state . . . " and thus ". . . hold whatever rights 
they enjoy at . . . " the mercy of the white population. 
Rendition, supra note 6, a t  59 n.48. 
27. Taney's states' rights position has been viewed as influential in shaping the Den- 
nison opinion: 
The [Dennison] opinion has been attributed to Chief Justice Taney's states' 
rights theories. . . . 
. . . Taney was formerly a slaveholder, and felt the same way that most 
other Southerners felt about states' rights and the Negro. The states should be 
protected from federal encroachments and thus should have the right to choose 
whether they shall be slave or free. 
Id. 
28. Interstate Rendition, supra note 6, at 112 n.82. 
29. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 370 (1873). 
30. See, e.g., People v. Millspaw, 257 A.D. 40, 41, 12 N.Y.S.2d 435, 437, reu'd on 
other grounds, 281 N.Y. 441, 24 N.E. 2d 117 (1939); State v. Coughlin, 90 Wash. 2d 835, 
838,586 P.2d 1145,1147 (1978). See also Carpenter v. Lord, 88 Or. 128,132,171 P. 577, 
578 (1918); In re Wallace, 38 Wash. 2d 67, 69, 227 P.2d 737, 738 (1951). 
31. E.g., New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 , 6  (1959) ("[AJccording the statute the full 
benefit of the presumption of constitutionality which is the postulate of constitutional 
adjudication, we must find clear incompatibility with the United States Constitu- 
tion. . . . [If there is none, it] is within the unrestricted area of action left to the States 
by the Constitution."); In re Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 772,775,349 P.2d 956,957, 3 Cal. Rptr. 
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acted in most jurisdictions," exerts this reserved power. The 
UCEA is broader than federal extradition law (e.g., it covers the 
extradition of nonfugitives) and also confers a distinct discre- 
tionary power upon the asylum governor in extradition situa- 
tions not covered by federal law." Nevertheless, as to the rendi- 
tion of fugitive criminals-which is the area covered by federal 
statutes-the wording of the UCEA is very similar to that of 
federal law? Moreover, in many cases, court interpretations of 
this portion of the UCEA have been similar to that of Dennison, 
i.e., although the duty of the asylum governor is often described 
as mandatory or ministerial, it is considered unenforceable by 
the courts.86 
A number of state courts, in adherence to the separation of 
powers concept, refuse to issue a writ of mandamus to compel 
the governor to fulfill a ministerial obl igat i~n.~~ These courts 
would undoubtedly apply the same reasoning if requested to 
140, 141 (1960) ("It is settled, however, that the federal constitutional and statutory pro- 
visions are not exclusive and that the states are free to cooperate with one another by 
extending interstate rendition beyond that required by federal law.") 
32. As of January 1980, only the District of Columbia, Mississippi, and South Caro- 
lina had not adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. It is in force in 51 jurisdic- 
tions, including 48 states. 11 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 10 (West Supp. 1980). 
33. The UCEA provides the following: 
The Governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the Execu- 
tive Authority of any other state, any person in this state charged in such 
other state . . . with committing an act in this state, or in a third state, inten- 
tionally resulting in a crime in the state whose Executive Authority is making 
the demand . . . . 
UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT 5 6. 
34. The fugitive provisions of the UCEA state the following: 
Subject to the provisions of this act, the provisions of the Constitution of the 
United States controlling, and any and all acts of Congress enacted in pursu- 
ance thereof, it is the duty of the Governor of this state to have arrested and 
delivered up to the Executive Authority of any other state of the United States 
any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has 
fled from justice and is found in this state. 
Id. g 2. 
35. See, e.g., Ex parte Cohen, 23 N.J. Super. 209, 215, 92 A.2d 837, 840 (Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1952), aff'd, 12 N.J. 362, 96 A.2d 794 (1953)); Moreaux v. Ferrin, 98 Utah 450, 
454, 100 P.2d 560, 563 (1940) ("The duty to issue a warrant upon receipt of a proper 
requisition is ministerial, and although there is no authority whereby anyone may com- 
pel the Governor to issue his warrant if he refuses to do so, nevertheless, the act is not a 
, 
discretionary one.") See also 31 AM. JUR. 2d Extradition 5 48, at 956-57 (1967). But see 
In re Morgan, 244 Cal. App. 2d 903,910,53 Cal. Rptr. 642, 647 (1966); In re Harris, 170 
Ohio St. 151, 154, 163 N.E.2d 762, 765 (1959). 
36. Interstate Rendition, supra note 6, at  99 n.13 ("Eighteen states refuse to direct 
a writ of mandamus to the governor under any circumstances.") See, e.g., State v. Cone, 
137 Fla. 496, 497, 188 So. 93, 93 (1939). 
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compel the governor to extradite a fugitive. Other state courts 
will direct a writ of mandamus to the governor to compel the 
performance of certain ministerial functions.37 Nevertheless, al- 
though no case considering this specific issue arose before 
Brown,J8 dicta in the opinions of several of these courts indicate 
that they would not issue mandamus to compel the governor to 
extradite,sg even though it appears to be a ministerial duty. 
D. Extradition in C a l i f ~ r n i a ~ ~  
South Dakota v. Brown41 was only the second case to con- 
sider the nature of the asylum state governor's duty to extra- 
dite.42 To comprehend the significance of this decision, a basic 
understanding of California extradition law is essential. 
In the case In re Man~hes te r ,~~  a decision predating Denni- 
son, the California Supreme Court stated in dictum that "the 
Courts of the State possess no power to control the Executive 
discretion and compel a surrender [of a f~gitive]."~~ The lan- 
guage of California's original extradition statute, still in effect at 
that time, was similar to that of the federal statute: 
A person charged in any State or Territory of the United 
States, with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from 
justice, and be found in this State, shall on demand of the ex- 
37. Interstate Rendition, supra note 6, at 99 n.14 ("Twenty states will direct a gov- 
ernor to perform a ministerial function.") See, e.g., Jenkins v. Knight, 46 Cal. 2d 220, 
222, 293 P.2d 6, 7 (1956). 
38. South Dakota v. Brown, 138 Cal. Rptr a t  15. 
39. E.g., Ex parte Cohen, 23 N.J. Super. 209, 215,92 A.2d 837, 840 (Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1952), aff'd 12 N.J. 362, 96 A.2d 694 (1953); People v. Millspaw, 257 App. Div. 40, 
41, 12 N.Y.S.2d 435, 437 rev'd on other grounds, 281 N.Y. 441, 24 N.E. 2d 117 (1939). 
These courts supported this dicta primarily by reliance on Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 
66 (1861) and other Supreme Court decisions, like, for example, Taylor v. Taintor, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1873). 
40. See generally Conley, supra note 18; Mosk, Extradition Procedure in Califor- 
nia, 14 CAL. ST. B.J. 121 (1939); Yager, supra note 18. 
41. 20 Cal. 3d 765, 576 P.2d 473, 144 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1978). 
42. South Dakota v. Brown, 138 Cal. Rptr at  15. 
43. 5 Cal. 237 (1855). This case concerned a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to 
test the sufficiency of an extradition warrant. 
44. Id. a t  238. It should be noted that the idea that the governor could not be com- 
pelled to extradite had been suggested long before Dennison. As one authority observed. 
The Supreme Court had intimated in the case of Prigg v. Commonwealth, 
nearly twenty years before [Dennison], that there was no power lodged in the 
general government to compel State officers to perform the duties imposed 
upon them in the act of 1793; and Chancellor Kent had expressed the same 
opinion in his Commentaries many years earlier. 
Hoague, supra note 16, at  214 (footnotes omitted). 
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ecutive authority of the State or Territory from which he fled, 
be delivered up by the Governor of this State, to be removed to 
the State having jurisdiction of the crime.*= 
Apparently the court interpreted this statute as investing the 
asylum governor with a discretionary duty to extradite a fugi- 
. tive, since the court specifically used the term "discretion" in 
Manchester. 
The California extradition provisions were revised in 1872. 
The only significant change from the version previously quoted 
was the substitution of "must, on demand" for the words "shall 
on demand."46 This particular change was never interpreted by 
the courts until Brown.47 
The California extradition law was not changed again until 
the adoption of the UCEA in 1937." The UCEA was enacted 
with only one significant variation from the uniform model.49 
California was the only jurisdiction to alter section 7 so that it 
no longer appeared to confer any gubernatorial discretion. Sec- 
tion 7 of the UCEA states: "If the Governor decides that the 
demand should be complied with, he shall sign a warrant of ar- 
rest . . . . "60 In California this section was changed to read, "If 
a demand conforms to the provisions of this chapter, the Gover- 
nor or agent authorized in writing by the Governor . . . shall 
sign a warrant of arrest . . . ."61 Taken at face value, this 
change appears to leave little room for discretion. 
Since the adoption of the UCEA there have been instances 
when, although the requests for extradition fulfilled the statu- 
tory requirements, the Governor of California has exercised his 
discretion in refusing to extradite individuals. He has done so on 
the basis of equitable concerns." Likewise, legal scholars have 
45. California Criminal Practice Act, ch. 29, 5 665, 1851 Cal. Stats. 286 (current 
version a t  CAL. PENAL CODE $5 1548-1548.3 (West 1970)). 
46. CAL. PENAL CODE 5 1548 (1872)(current version at  CAL. PENAL CODE $8 1548- 
1548.3 (West 1970) (the references to "territories" were also deleted). 
47. The Brown court found this change to more imperative wording to be of "little, 
if any, significance." 20 Cal. 3d at 772, 576 P.2d at  478, 144 Cal. Rptr. a t  763. 
48. CAL. PENAL CODE 55 1548-1556.2 (West 1970). 
49. There have been various alterations of the UCEA in the various jurisdictions 
that have adopted it. See 11 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 60-295 (West 1974). 
50. UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT 8 7. 
51. CAL. PENAL CODE 5 1549.2 (West 1970). 
52. See Mosk, supra note 40, at 125, where the author gave the following example: 
Occasionally there arises an exceptional case in which the ends of justice 
require particular consideration. Just recently a southwestern state sought the 
return of a man on a charge of having escaped from its state penitentiary. 
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noted that the Governor of California has the power to exercise 
some discretion in the area of e~tradition.'~ On the other hand, 
Brown was the first significant comment by the California courts 
dealing with the Governor's discretion in extradition since 
M~nchester.'~ Before Brown, the courts that considered the ex- 
tradition duty, although only in dicta, characterized it not as a 
"matter of mere comity" but as an "absolute duty.'"' 
It would seem that the lack of a means of compulsion would 
not be a valid reason for nonenforcement of a ministerial or ab- 
solute duty to extradite in California, since the writ of manda- 
mus has regularly been issued to the governor by the California 
courts to compel the performance of ministerial duties? As the 
California Supreme Court stated in Jenkins u. Knight," "[Ilt 
has been consistently held for more than three quarters of a cen- 
tury that the writ [of mandamus] will issue to compel a governor 
to perform ministerial acts required by law."" 
Originally sentenced for five years on a burglary charge, the prisoner escaped 
seventeen years ago. During these past seventeen years, he changed his name, 
married, was expecting a child, worked regularly as a garage mechanic, was 
from time to time entrusted with large sums of money, and became favorably 
known in church and community activities. Finally, however, his employer was 
compelled to lay him off because of business reverses, and, being unable to find 
other employment, in desperation he sought a job as a WPA crossing guard 
and submitted to fingerprinting. In that manner he was apprehended. Since 
the purpose of imprisonment should be rehabilitation of the prisoner, and 
since this man had over seventeen long years indicated that he was a fully 
rehabilitated member of society, it would seem to have been a miscarriage of 
justice to have returned him to the demanding state. Governor Olson declined 
to return him. 
Id. 
53. See Conley, supra note 18, a t  160; Mosk, supra note 40, a t  125; Yager, supra 
note 18, a t  535. 
54. But cf. In re Cooper, 53 ' ~ a l .  2d 772,779,349 P.2d 956,959,3 Cal. Rptr. 140,143 
(1960) ("Protection from unjustified extradition does not lie in reading into the extradi- 
tion laws purely technical requirements . . . but in the sound judgment of the respective 
Governors charged with the administration of those laws. Their judgment is entitled to 
great weight."). 
55. E-g., In re Russell, 12 Cal. 3d 229, 234, 524 P.2d 1295, 1298, 115 Cal. Rptr. 511, 
514 (1974); In re Romaine, 23 Cal. 585, 590 (1863); In re Golden, 65 Cal. App. 3d 789, 
795, 135 Cal. Rptr. 512, 515 (1977); In re Morgan, 244 Cal. App. 2d 903, 910, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 642, 647 (1966). But cf. In re Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 772,779,349 P.2d 956,959,3 Cal. 
Rptr. 140, 143 (1960) (judgment of governors is entitled to great weight in the adminis- 
tration of extradition laws). 
56. See, e.g. Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal. 2d 351, 360, 196 P.2d 562, 568 (1948); Elli- 
ott v. Pardee, 149 Cal. 516, 520, 86 P. 1087, 1089 (1906); Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 
189, 212-13 (1870). 
57. 46 Cal. 2d 220, 293 P.2d 6 (1956). 
58. Id. a t  223, 293 P.2d at 7. 
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111. EXTRADITION U DER South Dakota u. Brown 
A. Background 
South Dakota u. Brownm is the only case since Dennison to 
directly consider the nature and enforceability of the asylum 
state governor's duty to extradite. It is important because it 
deals with the use of a writ of mandamus by a state court to 
enforce the governor's duty under either federal or state law. 
In July 1975, Dennis James Banks was convicted in South 
Dakota of two felonies, armed riot and assault with a dangerous 
weapon without intent to kill. Banks was released on bail while 
awaiting sentencing. Before sentencing, Banks fled South Da- 
kota and was subsequently apprehended on February 13, 1976, 
in California. On about February 15, 1976, Governor Edmund G. 
Brown, Jr. of California received documents from South Dakota 
requesting the extradition of Banks back to that state. The Cali- 
fornia Attorney General examined the extradition demand and 
found that it appeared to substantially comply with the require- 
ments of the extradition laws.60 
On December 28, 1976, South Dakota filed a petition for a 
writ of mandamus to compel Governor Brown to issue an extra- 
dition warrant, since he had failed to take any action on the ex- 
tradition demand? The state of South Dakota based its petition 
on the premise that both federal law and the California UCEA 
imposed a ministerial duty on Governor Brown to extradite 
Dennis Banks.6a Furthermore, it was South Dakota's contention 
that this ministerial duty was enforceable by the California Su- 
preme Court through a writ of mandate.63 
59. 20 Cal. 3d 765, 576 P.2d 473, 144 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1978). 
60. South Dakota v. Brown, 138 Cal. Rptr. a t  18. 
61. In his reply to an order to show cause why South Dakota's petition should not 
be granted, Governor Brown asserted: 
[I]t is not the prerogative of either the courts or the Legislature to compel the 
Governor to exercise his discretion in any particular manner or to force him to 
make decisions which he is not yet prepared to make. If the Governor, or any 
elected official, abuses discretion which he alone is empowered to exercise, he is 
answerable to the electorate and not to the courts. 
Id. 
62. Petition for Writ of Mandate a t  12-17, South Dakota v. Brown, 138 Cal. Rptr. 14 
(Ct. App. 1977). 
63. Id. a t  10-11. 
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B. The Brown Opinion 
1. Federal extradition provisions 
The California Supreme Court rejected South Dakota's ar- 
gument that the Federal Constitution and California legislation 
imposed a duty on Governor Brown enforceable by a California 
court. The court relied heavily on the Dennison holding that al- 
though the duty of the governor is ministerial, there is no power 
delegated to the "general government" to compel him to extra- 
dite?' Although South Dakota had not attacked Dennison, it 
unsuccessfully sought to limit the application of Dennison to 
cases involving the exercise of federal mandamus.6s The court 
rejected this contention, noting that South Dakota could not cite 
even one case in which a state court had used mandamus to 
compel extradition? The California court also emphasized the 
acceptance of the Dennison holding by the courts of several 
other states that the duty to extradite is unenforceable through 
judicial sanction.67 
64. See 20 Cal. 3d a t  769, 576 P.2d at 475-76, 144 Cal. Rptr at 760-61. 
In Dennison, the Supreme Court stated: "[Ilf the Governor . . . refuses to discharge 
this duty, there is no power delegated to the General Government, either through the 
Judicial Department or any other department, to use any coercive means to compel 
him." Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 109-110 (1861). This holding was 
reaffirmed by the Court in Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1872), which stated, 
"If [the governor] refuse [to extradite a fugitive], there is no means of compulsion." Id. 
a t  370. 
The Court's concern for states' rights was a primary consideration in the Dennison 
holding: 
[W]e think it clear, that the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has 
no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel 
him to perform it; for if it possessed this power, it might overload the officer 
with duties which would fill up all his time, and disable him from performing 
his obligations to the State . . . . 
65 U.S. (24 How.) at 107-08. 
65. Petition for Writ of Mandate a t  21-22. 
66. Regarding the lack of precedent for the issuance of mandamus, the Brown court 
stated the following: 
[Pletitioner has neither cited, nor have we found, a single case in the history of 
the Republic in which any state court has issued mandamus to compel extradi- 
tion . . . . The absence of such authority appears to reflect the uniform ac- 
ceptance of the highest state courts that, following Dennison and Taylor, with- 
out any specific implementing legislation, the constitutional duty of the state 
executive to extradite a fugitive is not judicially enforceable by either federal 
or state sanction. 
20 Cal. 3d a t  770, 576 P.2d at 476, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 761. 
67. Id. 
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2. California's extradition law 
The California Supreme Court recognized the right of states 
to provide for the extradition of persons whose extradition was 
not required by federal legislation. Nevertheless, it also rejected 
South Dakota's alternative assertion that the California UCEA 
provided an independent basis for state judicial enforcement of 
the extradition demand. 
The court acknowledged the fact that California was the 
only jurisdiction to seemingly remove the hint of gubernatorial 
discretion from section 7 of the UCEA in favor of a mandatory 
provis i~n.~  However, the court noted the similarity of the re- 
vised section (section 1549.2 of the California Penal Code) to the 
extradition clause of the Federal Constitution and to previous 
state legislation modeled after the federal clause? Because 
there was no record of any contradictory legislative intent, such 
continuity was interpreted as an effort to maintain the historic 
discretionary significance of the language?O Therefore, the court 
concluded that this change in the California UCEA, despite its 
mandatory language, was indicative of an unenforceable, discre- 
tionary duty." 
The Brown court emphasized that its holding was reinforced 
by "contemporaneous administrative ~onstruction''~~ of the 
UCEA by several California governors. These governors had ex- 
ercised discretion by declining extradition requests that were in 
proper form," and the court decided to not depart from the gov- 
ernors' administrative constr~ction.~' 
Finally, the court stressed the public policy considerations 
that supported an interpretation of the UCEA permitting guber- 
natorial discretion. The court anticipated various situations that 
would not respond to the "mechanical application of fixed and 
68. Id. at  771, 576 P.2d at  477, 144 Cal. Rptr. at  762. 
69. Id. at  773-74, 576 P.2d at 478-79, 144 Cal. Rptr. at  763-64. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Rancho Homes, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 764, 770-71, 256 
P.2d 305, 308 (1953) (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 25 Cal. 2d 918, 
921, 156 P.2d 1, 2-3 (1945)). In this case, the court stated: "[Tlhe contemporaneous ad- 
ministrative construction of the enactment by those charged with its enforcement and 
interpretation is entitled to great weight, and courts generally will not depart from such 
construction unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized." Id. 
73. 20 Cal. 3d at 777-78, 576 P.2d at  481-82, 144 Cal. Rptr. at  766-67. 
74. Id. 
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absolute rules if justice is to be achieved in a particular case."76 
Consequently, according to the court, gubernatorial discretion to 
deny extradition was necessary to avert injustice. Three exam- 
ples were given: (1) a case in which the fugitive has been a "wor- 
thy law-abiding citizen" since residing in the asylum state, (2) a 
case in which the fugitive's "physical safety or right to a fair 
trial cannot be assured in the demanding state," or (3) a case in 
which "the offense charged does not constitute a crime in [the 
asylum state]."76 In light of these considerations, the court con- 
cluded that "as a matter of public policy courts may not enforce 
the Governor's duty to comply with extradition demands. . . . 
We would not serve the ends of justice if we attempted judicial 
interference with the Governor's di~cretion."~~ Furthermore, the 
court observed that the governor could only be compelled by 
mandamus to exercise his discretionary power. In other words, 
when "[flaced with such a demand [for the extradition of a fugi- 
tive] the Governor may say yes or no. What he may not do is say 
nothing."78 
3. The Mosk Opinion 
Justice Mosk, joined by Justice Clark, dissented from the 
majority opinion in Brown. This is noteworthy since Justice 
Mosk was formerly a secretary to the governor of California in 
charge of extradition  proceeding^.^^ Justice Mosk first empha- 
sized the position of the California courts that mandamus will 
issue to enforce a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the gov- 
ernor?O He also felt that the authority of Dennison had been 
overextended by the majority opinion. According to the dissent, 
Dennison and the federal cases following it are "merely author- 
ity for the proposition that under our federal system of govern- 
ment, federal courts cannot direct governors of sovereign states 
to comply with their duty. . . . [I]t did not purport to deny to 
the states their right to compel state governors to adhere to con- 
stitutional and statutory commands.'"l Mosk felt that the rigid 
75. Id. at 779, 576 P.2d at 482, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 767. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 780, 576 P.2d at 483, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 768. 
79. Mosk, supra note 40, at 121. 
80. 20 Cal. 3d at 781-82, 576 P.2d at 483-84, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 768-69 (Mosk, J., 
dissenting). 
81. Id. 
3761 EXTRADITION DISCRETION 389 
federalism of Dennison might not be followed today if the same 
issue came before the Supreme Court.82 
Turning to the nature of the governor's duty to extradite, 
Justice Mosk first emphasized that the federal and state extradi- 
tion provisions speak of the duty of the asylum state governor in 
mandatory terms.8s Moreover, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the duty is ministerial in nature, not discreti~nary.~' In 
this regard, Justice Holmes said, "The Constitution . . . pe- 
remptorily requires that upon proper demand, the person 
charged shall be delivered up to be removed to the State having 
jurisdiction of the crime. There is no discretion allowed, no in- 
quiry into motives."85 The dissent also stressed that the Califor- 
nia Supreme Court and other California courts had also charac- 
terized the duty to extradite under the Federal Constitution as 
being mandatory in nature;M for example, extradition was de- 
scribed by the California Supreme Court as "an absolute right of 
the demanding state and duty of the asylum state under the fed- 
eral Constit~tion."~~ 
Justice Mosk next considered the majority's interpretation 
of the California UCEA and found it to be misguided. Section 
1549.2 of the California Penal Code had been altered from the 
less mandatory language of the UCEA to express the duty of the 
governor in clearly mandatory terms. The dissent found this fac- 
tor to totally negate the majority's attempts to demonstrate a 
legislative intent to grant discretion? 
The majority opinion also cited examples of contemporane- 
ous administrative construction of the extradition laws. In this 
regard, it quoted an article by Justice Mosk that gives several 
examples of situations in which California governors had denied 
extradition. Nevertheless, Justice Mosk refuted the inference 
that the denials by California governors were indicative of a dis- 
cretionary duty. He reiterated a paragraph from his article 
describing the narrow limits of the governor's inquiry upon re- 
82. Id. at 781 n.1, 576 P.2d at 484 n.1, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 769 n.1. 
83. Id. at 782, 576 P.2d at 484, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 769. 
84. Id. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 106 (1861). 
85. Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1914) (citations omitted). 
86. 20 Cal. 3d at 782-83, 576 P.2d at 484-85, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70 (Mosk, J., 
dissenting). 
87. In re Russell, 12 Cal. 3d 229, 234, 524 P.2d 1295, 1298, 115 Cal. Rptr. 511, 514 
(1974). 
88. 20 Cal. 3d at 783-84, 576 P.2d at 485, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 770 (Mosk, J., 
dissenting). 
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ceiving an extradition request. The inquiry basically comprised a 
determination of the sufficiency of the demand; inquiry into the 
crime itself or the guilt of innocence of the fugitive was prohib- 
ited? Therefore, the governors who denied extradition contra- 
vened their mandatory duty only because of unusual and com- 
pelling  circumstance^.^^ Justice Mosk stated that "[iln those 
'exceptional' instances, the Governors of California realized they 
were failing to meet their extradition obligations and forth- 
rightly explained their reasons in a communication to the Gover- 
nor of the demanding state."@' Moreover, judicial review was 
lacking because none of those actions was ever challenged in 
After consideration of all of the above factors, Justice Mosk 
concluded that 
[tlhe interests of an effective and impartial criminal justice 
system, and the prevention of discord and retaliation among 
the states of the union, are best preserved by the enforcement 
of the Governor's mandatory duty to issue his warrant in re- 
sponse to a proper request for extradition. Should the fugitive 
believe the demand to be legally insufficient, he may review the 
proceedings by means of habeas corpus.@3 
In his opinion, the validity of this conclusion was "compounded 
when, as here, the fugitive has already been tried, found guilty 
of serious felonies, and has fled to avoid imposition of 
senten~e."~ 
IV. PROPRIETY OF THE Dennison AND Brown DECISIONS 
A. Dennison 
The Dennison and Brown decisions are unique not only be- 
cause they are the only cases to directly confront the nature of 
the asylum state governor's extradition duty:" but also because 
of the unusual circumstances surrounding their proceedings. The 
facts of Dennison reveal the potential for a controversial deci- 
sion. The offense charged was that of assisting in the escape of a 
89. Id. at 784-85, 576 P.2d at 485, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 770. 
90. Id. at 785, 576 P.2d at 486, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 771. 
91. Id. at 785 n.2, 576 P.2d at 486 n.2, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 771 n.2. 
92. Id. at 785, 576 P.2d at 486, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 771. 
93. Id. at 787, 576 P.2d at 487, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 772. 
94. Id. 
95. South Dakota v. Brown, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 15. 
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slave; the offender was a "free man of color." The governor of 
Ohio, a free state, refused to extradite because the asserted of- 
fense was not a crime in Ohio. Therefore, Kentucky petitioned 
for a writ of mandamus to compel the extradtion. This brief sy- 
nopsis reveals a situation in which any result would be offensive 
to the government and society of one of the states. 
If one looks beyond the confines of the opinion, the gravity 
of the decision facing the Court becomes even more obvious. Not 
only did the case directly involve the slavery problem, but it also 
arose just prior to, and served as a catalyst for, the Civil War?' 
Chief Justice Taney, the author of the Dennison opinion, was 
certainly not isolated from the controversy: he was an advocate 
of states' rights and a former s laveh~lder .~~ In addition, the 
other justices were surely aware of the pulse of the nation. 
In view of the political and social pressures involved, the 
Supreme Court reached the practical result in Dennison. Denni- 
son is the only case in which the Supreme Court has been asked 
to issue mandamus to a g o v e r n ~ r . ~  The emphasis at that time 
was on state sovereignty at the expense of a strong federal gov- 
ernment. The slave states wanted to retain the status quo in or- 
der to preserve their unique life style. Kentucky had esentially 
asked the Court to open a Pandora's Box by requesting the 
Court to compel Ohio's governor to extradite in defiance of the 
principle of state sovereignty. The Court's response was simple: 
the federal government was not empowered to compel the gover- 
nor to extradite. This ruling was in harmony with the concept of 
state sovereignty and was more favorable for Kentucky's long- 
term interests than the remedy for which it had petitioned. 
Avoiding the possibility of federal-state conflict was impliedly 
one basis for the Court's decision. 
However practical the result, the Dennison rationale was 
suspect. First, the Court said the governor's duty was "not a dis- 
cretionary duty upon which [the governor] is to exercise any 
judgment" but was "a mere ministerial duty." Thereafter, the 
Court designated the duty a "moral" rather than a "legal" duty. 
Perhaps the Court was simply describing the effect of the fed- 
eral government's inability to enforce the governor's duty, but 
the Court's intention was not clearly elucidated. The result was 
96. The Dennison case was decided in 1861. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 US. (24 
How.) 66 (1861). See also 138 Cal. Rptr. at 15 n.3. 
97. Rendition, supra note 6, at 59 n. 48. 
98. Interstate Rendition, supra note 6, at 98 n.9. 
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an ambiguous characterization of the asylum state governor's 
duty. 
Although the decision met with general approval at the 
time, Dennison was later criticized. As indicated above, the crit- 
ics questioned whether the drafters of the Constitution would 
have couched the governor's duty to extradite in mandatory 
terms without intending that it be enforceable. This criticism is 
not well-founded as applied to the Dennison holding because of 
Dennison's underlying rationale that the U.S. Constitution does 
not contemplate the exercise of such an extensive power by the 
federal government over the executive branch of the states. 
However, the implicit criticism of Dennison's ambivalence on 
the nature of the duty is justified. 
In the final analysis, the Dennison holding was proper and 
is supported by the concept that the federal courts were not em- 
powered to exercise mandamus to compel the governor of a state 
to fulfill his mandatory duties. This fact notwithstanding, the 
decision may be justly criticized for its vacillation on the nature 
of the governor's duty. The governor's duty is couched in 
mandatory terms and could properly have been interpreted as a 
ministerial duty within the state's exclusive sovereign power, 
and therefore unenforceable by the federal courts. Moreover, the 
ultimate effect of Dennison's fuzzy reasoning was to create a hy- 
brid duty-a mandatory duty unenforceable in state and federal 
courts. This concept was reinforced by South Dakota u. Brown. 
B. South Dakota v. Brown 
1. Historical abstract 
Brown was also accompanied by a complicated and contro- 
versial factual situation. Dennis Banks, whom South Dakota 
sought to extradite, was a leader of the liberal American Indian 
Movement.@@ In 1973 he was involved in an incident at the 
Custer County Courthouse in South Dakota. A young Indian 
had been stabbed to death by a white man, and the dead man's 
mother asked Banks for assistance in seeking justice. Conse- 
quently, Banks and others demonstrated at the courthouse 
against the minimal bail that had been set for the accused killer. 
According to one report, the demonstrators were met by police 
99. Rubin, Dennis Banks's Extradition Fight, 94 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 691, 691 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Banks]; Rubin, South Dakota v. Dennis Banks, 225 NATION 
113, 113 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dennis Banks]. 
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outfitted with tear gas and guns. In the ensuing fray, the court- 
house and chamber of commerce were set on fire. Banks was ar- 
rested three days later and was subsequently convicted for his 
role in the incident.loO 
The controversy was further complicated because of the ac- 
rimonious relationship that existed between Banks and South 
Dakota's attorney general, William Janklow. In 1967, while Jan- 
klow was serving as a legal advisor to the Rosebud Sioux, he was 
identified in tribal court by a 15-year-old Indian rape victim as 
her assailant. The incident was investigated and a report was 
submitted to the FBI, but no charges were ever brought against 
Janklow.lol 
In 1972 Banks initiated another investigation of the case. 
When the case was finally heard by the tribal court in 1974, 
Banks was the attorney of record at the proceeding. Janklow was 
summoned but did not appear before the tribal court, and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs area director refused to deliver docu- 
ments subpoenaed from the rape file. Nevertheless, based on the 
testimony of the victim and the original investigator, the tribal 
court found probable cause that Janklow was guilty of two of- 
fenses under the tribal code. As a result, the tribal court dis- 
barred him from practicing law on the reservation.lo2 
In 1975, before Banks was sentenced in Custer County, he 
fled South Dakota for California. He claimed that serving a jail 
term in South Dakota would jeopardize his life.loS When South 
Dakota sought to extradite Banks, Governor Brown received nu- 
merous documents urging denial of South Dakota's request for 
"a variety of substantial reasons."lM His decision not to act on 
the demand prompted South Dakota to petition the Supreme 
Court of California for a writ of mandamus to compel the extra- 
dition. The supreme court transferred the petition to the court 
of appeal. 
The court of appeal concluded that the governor's duty to 
extradite under the California UCEA was mandatory and issued 
a writ of mandamus. During the trial the court denied a motion 
by Banks' attorney to introduce evidence why he should not be 
100. Banks, supra note 99, at 692; Dennis Banks, supra note 99, at 114. 
101. Dennis Banks, supra note 99, at 113. See Banks, supra note 99, at 692. 
102. Dennis Banks, supra note 99, at 113-14. See Banks, supra note 99, at 692. 
103. Banks, supra note 99, at 691. 
104. Banks, supra note 99, at 691; Dennis Banks, supra note 99, at 115. 
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extradited.lo5 On appeal, the Supreme Court of California va- 
cated the decision of the court of appeal and held that the gov- 
ernor's duty was unenforceable by the courts through a writ of 
mandate.lo6 Consequently, Banks was not extradited. 
2. Analysis of Brown 
The most influential portion of the majority's rationale in 
Brown was the discussion of the public policy considerations 
that, according to the majority, compelled a discretionary, unen- 
forceable duty. The court observed that the "individual circum- 
stances surrounding extradition demands are varied and diverse, 
thus rendering peculiarly inappropriate the mechanical applica- 
tion of fixed and absolute rules if justice is to be achieved in a 
particular case."lo7 
The court reasoned that mandamus, a legal remedy, is in- 
sensitive to the equitable considerations that the governor may 
consider if he has discretion to do so. If the governor's duty were 
mandatory, on the other hand, fugitives would be forced to seek 
their remedies following extradition in the demanding state's 
court system. That court system may be insensitive to, or inca- 
pable of, considering their equitable pleas.los Mandamus is also 
insensitive to due process violations and substantive defenses, 
two other types of pleas to which gubernatorial discretion has 
been responsive under certain circumstances-even though the 
use of discretion in such cases may not be advisable.lO@ Guberna- 
torial discretion can resolve those cases where the demanding 
state still desires to enforce the demand, despite the presence of 
compelling equities.l1° Enforcement of the demand through 
mandamus could cause a grave miscarriage of justice in such a 
situation. In fact, the court of appeal was faced with this very 
situation in Brown when it denied a motion to admit evidence of 
an equitable nature. The court was compelled to follow an in- 
flexible course of action in enforcing what it found to be a 
mandatory, enforceable duty. The court believed that it could 
not consider evidence which Banks' attorney asserted would 
105. Dennis Banks, supra note 99, at 115. 
106. South Dakota v. Brown, 20 Cal. 3d 765,576 P.2d 473,144 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1978). 
107. Id. at 779, 576 P.2d at 482, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 767. 
108. See id.; BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 770 (3d ed. 1969) (mandamus is an ac- 
tion at law rather than an equitable remedy). 
109. Interstate Rendition, supra note 6, at 106-11. 
110. Id. 
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demonstrate a threat to the fugitive's life.'" 
The Mosk opinion, which favored enforcement by mandate, 
indicated that the fugitive could seek review of the extradition 
proceeding by means of habeas corpus if he believed the extradi- 
tion demand to be legally insufficient.l12 However, the scope of 
inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is very limited, and al- 
though this option is available to a fugitive, it is no more sensi- 
tive to equitable considerations than mandamus. As one com- 
mentator has observed: "[Iln a habeas corpus proceeding, it is 
the function of the court merely to determine whether a crime 
has been charged in the demanding state, and whether the fugi- 
tive in custody . . . is the person so charged. Equitable defenses 
are unac~eptable."~~~ 
Although the court was correct in questioning the ability of 
the asylum state courts to do justice in a particular case, the 
court seemed to ignore the fact that the extradition process is 
designed to return the fugitive to the criminal justice system pri- 
marily concerned with the disposition of his case. Isn't it possi- 
ble that justice can be done in the courts of the demanding 
state? This would appear to be the determinative issue, but it 
was not directly addressed by the court. The implication of the 
court's discussion was that the extradition demand itself consti- 
tuted an injustice in the face of certain equitable considerations, 
e.g., where the individual sought had established himself as a 
valued member of an asylum state community. In such cases, 
the court apparently felt that extradition was inherently unjust 
and that asylum state courts could not deny extradition in the 
face of a legally s d c i e n t  demand. Therefore, only the intelli- 
gent exercise of gubernatorial discretion could prevent injustice. 
In the United States our concern with the protection of in- 
dividual human rights might justify extradition refusals even 
when they frustrate the apparently legitimate demands of the 
demanding state. Nevertheless, in some cases a refusal may con- 
stitute an injustice to the demanding state and have the poten- 
tial to create disharmony between states. Therefore, although 
111. See Dennis Banks, supra note 99, at 115. 
112. 20 Cal. 3d at 787, 576 P.2d at 487, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 772. 
113. Rendition, supra note 6, at 52-53. See Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 89 
(1952); State v. Coughlin, 90 Wash. 2d 835,841-43,586 P.2d 1145,1148-49 (1978). But cf. 
Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), rev'd on procedural grounds, 338 U.S. 864 
(1949) (the court of appeals found that the petitioner should be released on habeas 
corpus because he had been subjected to previous due process violations in the demand- 
ing state). 
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the court's policy argument in favor of discretion is appealing, it 
should be noted that without any checks or balances such as 
those in the appellate process, the potential exists for abuse of 
gubernatorial discretion through unwarranted refusals. 
The asylum state governor should avoid denials that are jus- 
tified only by judging the adequacy of the demanding state's 
criminal justice system. The Brown court found that situations 
where the offense is not a crime in the asylum state, or where 
the fugitive's physical safety or right to a fair trial is in jeopardy 
in the demanding state, are examples of circumstances where 
discretion could be exercised to prevent injustice. However, the 
denial of extradition in these circumstances would constitute a 
possibly unwarranted judgment of the demanding state's crimi- 
nal justice system. Denials of this type have historically caused 
most of the interstate friction.llTherefore, it is arguable that 
Brown's public policy argument is invalid to the extent that it 
advocates such denials. 
Although a discretionary duty is supported by the public 
policy consideration that equitable factors must not be ne- 
glected, the court's discussion of the pertinent case law and leg- 
islation does not present a convincing argument for discretion. 
First, California dispensed with strict separation of powers long 
ago. As the Mosk opinion emphasized, California courts have 
been issuing mandamus to the governor for over a century. Sec- 
ond, Dennison, which the majority relied on to support its deci- 
sion, could be interpreted as applying only to federal courts. Al- 
though Dennison's application to state courts had been 
generally accepted, and the concept of an unenforceable extradi- 
tion duty had been specifically approved in the dicta of several 
state courts, no state court had faced that exact issue before 
Brown. Third, the California UCEA, the United States Constitu- 
tion, and federal legislation certainly seem to indicate a 
mandatory duty through their express wording. This is particu- 
larly true with the California version of the UCEA, since the leg- 
islature dropped possibly discretionary wording in favor of ex- 
press mandatory language. Fourth, the Brown court used the 
same ambiguous rationale to describe the nature of the extradi- 
tion duty as the Supreme Court did in Dennison. The court said 
that "although the Governor's duty may be characterized as 
114. Interstate Rendition, supra note 6, at 110-11. 
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'mandatory,' " it is not judicially enforceable.ll5 This seems to be 
a contradiction in terms, since a "mandatory" or "ministerial" 
duty is precisely the type of duty that is judicially enforceable 
through mandamus.ll6 Fifth, according to Justice Mosk the con- 
temporaneous administrative construction by California gover- 
nors was not characteristic of a discretionary duty because of 
communications made by the governors explaining the violation 
of their extradition duty."' This argument is not entirely con- 
vincing because, even with a discretionary duty, there may be a 
strong expectation that a governor's response will usually con- 
form to a certain norm; and custom may also dictate some expla- 
nation for nonconformity. Nevertheless, Justice Mosk's observa- 
tion does vitiate to some extent the majority's contemporaneous 
administrative construction argument. 
When all of these factors are considered, the Brown ratio- 
nale begins to look a little wan. The best explanation for this 
apparent judicial legislation is simply that Dennison's wide ac- 
ceptance has carved out an exception to the general principle of 
extradition, in spite of the express mandatory wording of all the 
legislation encountered by the court and in spite of the possibil- 
ity that Dennison might have been intended to apply only to 
federal courts. Dennison has created a type of hybrid duty-a 
mandatory but unenforceable duty-which by its unenforceabil- 
ity implicitly confers a discretionary power. It is a mandatory 
duty that mandamus cannot touch. Since public policy favors 
gubernatorial discretion in some instances to protect the individ- 
ual, the result is not undesirable, even though it may sometimes 
hinder the objectives of the demanding state. Nevertheless, this 
discretionary power should not be abused; governors should 
avoid refusals that result in injustice to the demanding state or 
that protect no substantial individual rights or interests. 
115. 20 Cal. 3d at 768, 576 P.2d at 475, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 760. 
116. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (3d ed. 1979); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 866 
(5th ed. 1979). See, e.g., Jenkins v. Knight, 46 Cal. 2d 220, 222-23, 293 P.2d 6, 7 (1956) 
(writ of mandamus can be issued to "compel a governor to perform ministerial acts re- 
quired by law"). 
117. 20 Cal. 3d at 785 n.2, 576 P.2d at 486 n.2, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 771 n.2 (Mosk, J., 
dissenting). 
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A. Areas of Potential Abuse 
Justice Mosk stated in Brown that the "interests of an ef- 
fective and impartial criminal justice system and the prevention 
of discord and retaliation among the states of the union" would 
best be preserved by a mandatory duty to extradite enforceable 
by mandamus.l18 Undeniably, a discretionary power creates a 
potential for discord and strife between states. South Dakota v. 
Brown and Kentucky v. Dennison are not isolated examples of 
situations where the demanding state was displeased with a re- 
fusal to extradite."@ While these two cases are more prominent, 
some denials not contested in court also resulted in serious in- 
terstate disharmony. For example, one governor retaliated 
against a refusal by paroling a prisoner in his state on the condi- 
tion that he go to the asylum state.120 Therefore, in view of gov- 
ernors' definite discretionary power, efforts to promote harmony 
among the states and an effective criminal justice system should 
be directed towards preventing the unwarranted exercise or 
abuse of discretion that might cause contention between states. 
One abuse of discretion that could result in strife between 
states is that of inaction on the part of the asylum state gover- 
nor. Mandamus may still be an important tool in promoting har- 
mony in such a situation. For instance, both the majority and 
the dissenting justices in Brown were disturbed by Governor 
Brown's failure to take any action on the extradition demand.lS1 
The majority expounded the principle that even though the gov- 
ernor's discretion may not be controlled by mandamus, a court 
through mandamus may compel the governor to act, i.e., make 
him say either yes or no.lSa Thus, in those jurisdictions that will 
issue mandamus to the governor, it may be used to compel a 
governor to act upon the extradition demand of a sister state. 
The greatest problems with interstate harmony from the 
governor's use of his discretionary power seem to arise in certain 
specific areas. Denials based on equitable pleas have caused lit- 
tle strife in the past because they contain no implicit criticism of 
118. Id. at 787, 576 P.2d at 487, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 772. 
119. See Interstate Rendition, supra note 6, at 110-11. 
120. Id. at 111 n.74. 
121. 20 Cal. 3d at 780,576 P.2d at 483,144 Cal. Rptr. at 768; id. at 787,576 P.2d at 
487, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 772 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
122. 20 Cal. 3d at 780, 576 P.2d at 483, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 768. 
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the demanding state.12s Such denials are usually not opposed, 
and the demanding state's requisition has occasionally been 
withdrawn. This has traditionally been recognized as an appro- 
priate area for the exercise of discretion."' 
One type of denial that has produced some discord is the 
denial that is not accompanied by adequate explanation.12' One 
governor indicated that such denials sometimes result in retalia- 
tory extradition refusals.126 One solution might be an amend- 
ment to the uniform legislation requiring that a comprehensive 
written report accompany each denial. This provision would dis- 
courage denials that have no adequate basis and foster docu- 
mentation of those denials that do. Thus, retaliatory refusals 
and discord would hopefully be eliminated. 
Another problem area includes denials of extradition based 
on substantive defenses. Such denials are infrequent, being pri- 
marily limited to occasional alibi evidence defenses,ln but they 
have been a source of friction because the demanding state often 
feels that the jurisdiction of its judiciary has been undercut."' 
The greatest conflict has resulted from denials based on 
past or prospective due process violations in the demanding 
state.12@ Even if based on constitutional or statutory grounds, 
such denials place the asylum state governor in the delicate posi- 
tion of being a judge of the demanding state's criminal justice 
system.lS0 Denials on due process grounds have resulted in cas- 
cading retaliatory denials in the past and have caused friction 
throughout a much broader range of interstate relations.lS1 
B. Possible Solutions 
One solution to problems with the substantive defense and 
due process denials would be to arrange for the fugitive's return 
through other than the traditional extradition process.lm There 
123. Interstate Rendition, supra note 6, at 109-110. 
124. Id. a t  110. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. a t  107. 
128. Rendition, supra note 6, a t  56. 
129. Interstate Rendition, supra note 6, at 110. 
130. Id. a t  110-11; Rendition, supra note 6, a t  56 & n.33. 
131. Interstate Rendition, supra note 6, a t  110-11 & n.74. 
132. Several uniform acts provide for the return, not extradition, of individuals sub- 
ject to their provisions, i.e., an entirely different procedure that eliminates the governor's 
participation. Rendition, supra note 6, a t  50-51 n.lO. An exception is the Uniform Recip- 
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are several uniform acts that may serve such a purpose under 
certain factual conditions.1Ss These acts, such as the Uniform 
Act for Out-of-State Probationer or Parolee Supervision, deal 
primarily with nonfugitive situations but can be adapted to fugi- 
tives who also fulfill their factual preconditions.lS4 
One commentator has suggested a solution, the substantial 
interest test, which would uniformly solve the problem of ill-ad- 
vised denials with their resultant disharmony. Under this test, 
the interest of the asylum state in keeping the fugitive, if first 
determined to be substantial, would be balanced against the in- 
terest of the demanding state in reacquiring the fugitive.lS6 The 
demanding state's interest would always be considered substan- 
tial; only the degree of substantiality would be evaluated.ls6 This 
test would result in the elimination of due process and substan- 
tive defense denials, since the asylum state would have no sub- 
stantial interest in such claims.lS7 If the governor were to apply 
such an extensive test to all extradition demands, denials suffer- 
ing from inadequate reasoning would be discouraged. Theoreti- 
cally, the denials would be limited to equitable considerations 
that involve interests of the asylum state which are more impor- 
tant than the interest of the demanding state in recovering the 
fugitive. Since reciprocity would be desirable, the substantial in- 
terest test could be uniformly enacted throughout the states by 
a joint agreement or compact between the governors.lS8 
The substantial interest test would help eliminate some of 
the discretionary elements leading to disharmony. Additionally, 
it would provide some flexibility. Even in a situation where the 
state would normally not be considered to have a substantial in- 
terest, e.g., in the case of a fugitive who is only temporarily in 
the asylum state, significant public interests in denial might con- 
stitute a sufficiently substantial interest to warrant denial. 
rocal Enforcement of Support Act, which provides for the rendition of an individual only 
through the normal extradition procedure, but allows the demanding-state courts to ob- 
tain jurisdiction over the defendant while the defendant is still in the asylum state. UNI- 
FORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT $8 5-6, 11, 14, 18 (1968 version). 
133. See, e.g., INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS: INTERSTATE COMPACT ON 
JUVENILES, UNIFORM ACT FOR OUT-OF-STATE PROBATIONER OR PAROLEE SUPERVISION; UNI- 
FORM ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 
134. See Rendition, supra note 6, at  50-51 n.lO, 57. 
135. Interstate Rendition, supra note 6, at 116-17. 
136. Id. at  116. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 117. 
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No matter what procedures are developed to determine the 
advisability of denial, the key to avoiding disharmony is making 
certain that the procedures are uniformly instituted and ac- 
cepted throughout the states.lsS This could be accomplished 
through an interstate executive agreement among the governors, 
as was suggested in conjunction with the substantial interest 
test. The primary problem with such an arrangement is the ab- 
sence of any mechanism to review the governor's decision in or- 
der to prevent arbitrary denials. The effectiveness of any proce- 
dures would depend upon the governor's determination to 
prevent interstate friction by wisely exercising his discretionary 
powers according to the uniform procedures. Even so, the pres- 
ence of uniform procedures would make the response of individ- 
ual governors more predictable. A state would know when denial 
may be expected, and discord would be less likely to result. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the asylum state governor's extradition duty ap- 
pears to be mandatory under the express language of the Consti- 
tution and federal legislation, Kentucky v. Dennison established 
a precedent for gubernatorial discretion that did not expressly 
extend to the states, but which appears to have been accepted 
by them. The decision in South Dakota v. Brown reinforced the 
pervasiveness of the Dennison rationale, which established the 
idea of the hybrid duty in the case of extradition-a mandatory 
but unenforceable duty. The practical result is that the asylum 
state governor possesses discretionary power. While public pol- 
icy favors such a result to the extent that it protects the individ- 
ual; the governor should first determine whether the courts of 
the demanding state have considered or will consider the factors 
that the governor finds compelling. If these factors will be con- 
sidered, then the fugitive should be returned to the demanding 
state in accordance with the theory behind extradition, i.e., the 
fugitive should be returned to the state having a vested interest 
in prosecuting the fugitive or meting out some punishment to 
him. 
Since the governor's discretionary power is not subject to 
control by the courts, specific guidelines should be developed to 
determine when extradition should be denied. Abuse of discre- 
139. See id. at 117 n.105 ("[The] true remedy for discretion is agreement between 
governors, not federal legislation.") 
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tion and ill-advised denials have created disharmony in the past 
and should be avoided. One commentator has suggested a sub- 
stantial interest balancing test, where extradition would be de- 
nied only where the interest of the asylum state is substantial 
and greater than the substantial interest of the demanding state. 
This test is a good one because it would favor the exercise of 
discretion only when there was an equitable plea involving an 
interest of the asylum state. The asylum state governor would 
not be put in the position of acting as the judge of the demand- 
ing state's criminal justice system, because any denials would be 
based on an overriding interest of the asylum state. Tradition- 
ally, such denials have caused little disharmony. 
No matter what procedures are developed to deal with the 
governor's discretionary power, they should be instituted uni- 
formly throughout the states. These procedures could be imple- 
mented uniformly by an interstate executive agreement between 
the governors. Although such an agreement could not guarantee 
the prudent exercise of discretion, it would certainly reduce the 
incidence of arbitrary denials by establishing a norm to which 
governors will be expected to adhere. The desire to preserve in- 
terstate harmony will be an impetus for conformance. In es- 
sence, such uniformity will result in predictability,140 and if a 
state knows when denials may be expected, the denials will 
likely be accepted without disharmony or reprisal. 
Gregory K. Wanlass 
140. Interstate Rendition, supra note 6 ,  at 120. 
